Technical reference

How $RMHT works

What the protocol actually does, written from the frozen source code — mechanisms, figures, residual powers and accepted limitations. No marketing.

In sync with the code frozen on 30 Aug 2026  ·  322/322 tests  ·  Robinhood Chain (4663)

01The immutable numbers

Fixed in the code at deployment. No function can change them — not even for the owner.

Total supply
1,000,000,000
Minted once, in the constructor
Smart-Vault
500,000,000
50% — released milestone by milestone
Milestone step
$500,000
of market cap, cumulative
Release
1.5%
of the remaining vault, each milestone
Buy / sell tax
0%
None. Revenue comes from LP fees
Milestone cooldown
24 h
Anti-manipulation delay

Allocation at deployment

AllocationAmountShareWhere the tokens sit
Smart-Vault500,000,00050.00%Held by the $RMHT contract itself, released only through milestones
Liquidity (LP)433,001,10443.30%Single-sided Uniswap v3 position, locked forever inside the LiquidityCustodian
Founder50,000,0005.00%FounderCustodian, one-year time lock, immutable
Community airdrop16,998,8961.70%AirdropCustodian, 18 addresses, individually claimable
About the airdrop

This is a 1-for-1 airdrop: every $MHT-BSC token held at the snapshot converts to 1 $RMHT. It is not a pro-rata share of a fixed envelope — the 16,998,896 total is simply the sum of the real balances of the 18 retained addresses, each truncated down to a whole token. The snapshot was frozen on 29 August 2026, and the table is written into the contract at deployment in a single transaction, with no way to add to it afterwards.

02The vault and its milestones

Half the supply is locked inside the contract, and only leaves when market cap crosses a milestone — and stays there, not for the span of one block.

A milestone is not crossed because the price touched a threshold once. It is crossed because market cap stayed above that threshold across several measurements spaced out in time. That is what makes an artificial pump useless here: you would have to hold the price up for thirty minutes of time-weighted average, then twenty more minutes of confirmations — something a flash loan structurally cannot do.

IDLE mcap < milestone ARMED confirmation 1 / 3 CONFIRMED 3 / 3 reached RELEASED 1.5% of vault mcap ≥ milestone +2 confirmations 10 min apart 24 h cooldown disarms if the price falls back below the milestone or if the 2-hour window expires
The full path of a milestone. Any step backwards resets the confirmation counter to zero.

The four steps in detail

  1. Arming. Market cap reaches the next milestone. The contract records the moment, counts a first confirmation, and opens a 2-hour window.
  2. Confirmations. Three confirmations are required in total, each at least 10 minutes apart. A reading taken too soon after the previous one simply does not count.
  3. Disarming. If at any point market cap falls back below the milestone, or if the two hours run out before the three confirmations, everything is cancelled and the counter restarts from zero.
  4. Release. Once the three confirmations are in and the 24-hour cooldown since the previous milestone has elapsed, 1.5% of the remaining vault is released and becomes claimable by holders. The next milestone is set $500,000 higher.
Why 1.5% of what remains, not of the total

The calculation applies to the remaining vault balance, never to the original 500 million. The amount released therefore shrinks with every milestone. The vault drains asymptotically: there is no exhaustion date, and no single milestone can ever empty it.

03Who triggers a milestone

Nobody in particular. And that is deliberate.

The contract exposes a public function, pokeMilestone(), that anyone can call, at any time, without permission. It reads the price, compares it to the target, and advances the state machine by one step if the conditions are met. If they are not, it does nothing and costs the caller only a little gas.

There is no third-party keeper, no proprietary bot, no subscription to fund. The protocol depends on no external service to move forward: if a single holder anywhere calls the function three times, ten minutes apart, while the price holds, the milestone fires. This is a deliberate architectural choice, made after what happened to $MHT V2 on BSC, where a paused third-party automation left the mechanism frozen for good.

What this means in practice

A milestone cannot be "forgotten". Nor can it be fired early or quietly: the function only evaluates public, verifiable conditions. Whoever calls it receives no privilege, no share, no advantage — they pay the gas, and that is all.

04How the price is computed

Two sources, never just one, and never an instantaneous price.

Market cap is computed in two stages: the price of $RMHT in ETH, then the price of ETH in dollars. Each stage has its own protection.

RMHT / ETH — an average, not a snapshot

The protocol never reads the pool's spot price. It uses a time-weighted average over a full 30 minutes (Uniswap v3 TWAP). Two direct consequences:

So that this window cannot be flushed by transaction spam, the pool is sized at deployment to store 1,801 observations — the full window, to the second. The contract refuses to be configured against a pool that lacks that capacity.

ETH / USD — Chainlink, with a freshness check

The dollar conversion comes from the official Chainlink ETH/USD feed on Robinhood Chain. The contract rejects any reading older than 26 hours, refuses a zero or negative price, and verifies that the answering round is not older than the requested one. The 26-hour threshold is not arbitrary: the feed advertises a 24-hour heartbeat, plus two hours of jitter margin.

Three layers, not one

Manipulating a milestone means defeating all three at once: moving a 30-minute average, holding it across three confirmations spaced 10 minutes apart inside a 2-hour window, and doing so with a fresh ETH/USD price supplied by an oracle you do not control. Any single layer could be worked around. All three together are out of flash-loan territory.

05How rewards reach you

Pro rata to what you hold, with no registration and nothing to do to become eligible.

When a milestone fires, the released tokens are not pushed to every address one by one — that would not scale. The contract increments a global "reward per token" accumulator. Your share follows from your balance at any moment, and you collect it whenever you want by calling claimRewards().

An important consequence: you do not have to do anything to accrue. Your entitlement grows as long as you hold. You lose nothing by waiting, and nothing expires.

Who counts in the calculation

Each holder's share is computed against the "eligible supply" — total supply minus everything that must not dilute holders:

ExcludedWhy
The vault (tokens still in the contract)Nobody holds them — counting them would mean paying rewards to ourselves
The Uniswap poolLiquidity is not a holder; including it would dilute everyone in favour of the pool
The burn addressDestroyed tokens, with no owner

Everything else counts, with no exceptions and no allow-list.

06The three custodians

Three separate contracts, with different rules, all deployed alongside the token.

ContractWhat it holdsExit rule
LiquidityCustodian The Uniswap v3 position NFT None. There is no function to withdraw liquidity or transfer the NFT. The position is locked permanently. The only thing that can leave is trading fees, through collect() — callable by anyone, and always paying the configured recipient, never the caller.
FounderCustodian The founder's 50,000,000 A one-year time lock, set at construction and immutable — no function can bring it forward. The milestone rewards those tokens accrue are, by contrast, claimable at any time.
AirdropCustodian The airdrop's 16,998,896 Claimable by each beneficiary as soon as either condition is met: one year elapsed, or the 5th milestone reached. Milestone rewards are claimable separately, without waiting for the principal to unlock.
About liquidity fees

There is no transaction tax. Revenue comes from Uniswap v3 swap fees, captured by the LiquidityCustodian. The function that collects them is open to everyone — not a weakness, but the guarantee that collection keeps working even if nobody is left to take care of it.

07Governance and residual powers

What disappears after launch, and what does not. The part that cannot honestly be summed up as "renounced".

After deployment, the configuration is locked (lockConfig()) and ownership is then renounced on all four contracts. From that point the pool is frozen forever, allocations can no longer be changed, no token can be frozen or blacklisted, and there is no pause function anywhere.

One role deliberately remains, and it deserves to be stated plainly rather than discovered in the code.

The feedGovernor role — the one residual power

This role is entirely separate from ownership and survives renouncement. It can do exactly one thing: replace the addresses of the two Chainlink oracles — the ETH/USD feed and the sequencer uptime feed. It cannot touch the pool, the allocations, the vault, any balance, or any threshold or constant in the protocol. Every other administrative function is out of its reach, and that is enforced by test.

Why it exists: on $MHT V2, on BSC, an oracle dependency failed after contract ownership had been renounced. There was then no way left to repair anything, and roughly 76% of the supply ended up frozen for good. feedGovernor is the answer to that specific failure — the minimum ability to repair a broken oracle, and nothing more.

It is held by a hardware wallet, separate from the deployment key, can be transferred in two steps to a multisig, and can be permanently destroyed by its holder through renounceFeedGovernor() on the day the feeds are considered settled. From that day, the protocol has no residual power of any kind.

After launchStatus
Change the pool, the milestones, the supply, any thresholdImpossible — constants, or locked configuration
Add or modify an airdrop allocationImpossible — one-shot, then ownership renounced
Freeze, blacklist or seize tokensImpossible — the function does not exist
Pause the protocolImpossible — the function does not exist
Withdraw liquidityImpossible — the function does not exist in the custodian
Replace a Chainlink oracle addressPossible, by feedGovernor only

08Known and accepted limitations

What is not perfect, and why this trade-off was chosen over the alternative.

The sequencer uptime check will be inactive

The code knows how to verify that an L2 sequencer is running before accepting a price, and that path is tested. But Chainlink publishes no uptime feed for Robinhood Chain, and has announced it is no longer deploying them to new networks. Making the check mandatory would have blocked every price read forever, freezing half the supply. The check is therefore disabled at deployment, and feedGovernor can switch it on without redeployment the day a feed exists. In the meantime, the Chainlink freshness check, the 30-minute average and the three confirmations all remain active.

One airdrop allocation will most likely never be claimed

One of the 18 snapshot addresses is a custodial wallet whose holder does not control the keys. Its 150,000 tokens — 0.88% of the airdrop — were credited anyway, so that the announced rule applies with no exception in either direction. The mechanical consequence, stated here rather than hidden: that share stays counted as active and will permanently take 0.88% of the milestone rewards otherwise going to the other 17 beneficiaries.

The vault never empties completely

Because each milestone releases 1.5% of what remains, the series converges towards zero without reaching it. That is a property of the model, not a defect: it guarantees there is always something left to distribute, but it also means a residual fraction stays in the contract indefinitely.

The window between deployment and lock-down

The TWAP needs 30 minutes of observations before it can be used. The final configuration lock therefore cannot run in the same breath as the deployment: there is a short period during which the token is tradable while the configuration is not yet frozen. That window ran from the deployment to the configuration lock, both on 4 September 2026; what happened inside it, and what the launch cost down to the wei, is written up on the transparency page.

09Check it yourself

Nothing above requires taking our word for it.

Every constant quoted on this page is a public variable of the contract, readable from any explorer or from the command line. The most useful ones:

Review status as of 30 August 2026

322 automated tests, including invariants run across 128,000 random calls with no violation. Eight independent analysis tools run against the code: Slither, Solhint, Mythril, Wake, Aderyn, Surya, SolidityScan and the Foundry suite. Line coverage between 98.4% and 100% depending on the contract. SCSVS/SCSTG checklist: 227 items reviewed, no Critical, High or Medium item left open.

Automated scanning additionally raises two Critical and one High. All three are analysed as false positives, and the reasoning is written into the source rather than kept private:

  • the liquidity custodian's permissionless collect() — the fees it moves can only reach the configured recipient, never a caller-chosen address;
  • the airdrop unlock threshold — the scanner flags it as soon as the value drops below 10. Compiling the contract at 10 and at 5 and comparing the runtime bytecode shows the same length and two changed constant bytes, with no access-control instruction touched;
  • a read-only reentrancy on the price read — closed by require(slot0().unlocked) and covered by a dedicated test.

A scan re-run by anyone will show those three. They are listed here so the numbers match what an independent check returns.

Deployed contract addresses

Deployed on Robinhood Chain (chain 4663) on 4 September 2026. The four contracts we wrote are verified on Blockscout — readable source, exact match against the deployed bytecode — and ownership has been renounced on all four.

ContractAddressState
$RMHT
token and vault
0xbD4487dad62d23e0677E6a94c99cB0AE45328bA4Verified · owner() = address(0) · configuration locked
RMHTAirdropCustodian
the airdrop's 16,998,896
0xdEc68344a41Cc6104ed5ff2C88F2D16a794688C1Verified · owner() = address(0)
RMHTFounderCustodian
the founder's 50,000,000
0x4C944c27160A1532b9De3a69d0Ec64164a6f03d8Verified · owner() = address(0)
RMHTLiquidityCustodian
holder of the LP position
0x50336e2a1396364895702a5222faC47bD0d38407Verified · owner() = address(0) · position tokenId 1004464
Uniswap v3 pool
RMHT / WETH
0xabe3B1fF5Fc6a9638D0c46f2379B20f7e6173bEeDeployed by the Uniswap factory, not by us

The only role that survives the renounce is feedGovernor, held by 0xC90e404A9f2ea55cbD2C81cf0054FAe4A721889a; what it can and cannot do is set out in section 07. The scanner findings, the market-cap gap against aggregators and what the launch cost are answered point by point on the transparency page.